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This essay was written during Adam Powell’s doctoral studies at Durham University (UK). Powell’s 
research explores the doctrinal and ritual development of  historical religious groups through the lens 
of  social-scientific theories of  identity. He is now Assistant Professor of  Religious Studies at Lenoir-
Rhyne University’s Center for Graduate Studies of  Asheville in North Carolina. 
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‡ The Ideal—One Possibility for the Future of Religious Identity ‡ 
 
 Scholars in the area of  religious studies face a conspicuous challenge if  and when they desire to 
employ the concept of  identity: Given the overabundance of  theories and the notorious difficulties in 
articulating a consistently acceptable definition, is identity still relevant for the nature and scope of  
contemporary research on religious phenomena? In Religion, Identity, and Change, anthropologists Simon 
Coleman and Peter Collins inadvertently, yet incisively, encapsulate the dilemma. They show that each 
identity theory fits into one of  two classifications: primordial or situationalist.1 The former is essentially 
the view of  identity that suggests historical continuity. On the other hand, those theories of  identity 
labeled situationalist often make antithetical statements about societies and human nature, emphasizing 
the inconsistency of  identity and the tendency for certain personas to emerge out of  specific scenarios. 
In other words, observing and analyzing identities requires recognition of  the situations that engender 
them.  
 If  these two types are understood broadly—allowing the primordial to include any identity 
theory or definition for which continuity is central, and situationalist theories being those founded on 
the premise that identity is contextually contingent—many of  the most popular theories, both old and 
new, find their place. Taken in turn, each category illuminates one pole on the spectrum that extends 
between assumption and observation, what is thought to be true and what is seen to be true. Perhaps 
this does not constitute an irresolvable impasse, however. If  religious identity is understood to be an 
ideal, a latent possibility rather than a realized actuality, we may be closer to bridging the chasm between 
the primordial and the situational. 
The Primordial 
                                                 
1 Simon Coleman and Peter Collins, eds. Religion, Identity, and Change: Perspectives on Global Transformations (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004), 4. 
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 The primordial view of  identity may entail continuity between community and individual, past 
and present, et cetera. Often this is the sort of  identity intended by those pushing for recognition of  a 
certain ethnicity or nationality; uniformity/homogeneity is paramount. Yet, this category also 
encompasses many of  the most popular ideas from religious studies’ past. In 1965, for instance, the 
sociologist Robert Bellah suggested, 
…the central function of a religion is to act as a cultural gyroscope, to provide a stable set of 
definitions of the world and, correlatively, of the self…It is this stability, continuity, and 
coherence provided by commitment to a set of religious symbols (or perhaps better to what they 
symbolize) that give religion such a prominent place in defining the identity of a group or person. 
Identity is a statement of what a person or a group is essentially and, as it were, permanently.2  
During the 1960s and 70s, scholars of  religion began to address the relationship of  the individual 
to his or her religion. One of  the underlying assumptions, of  course, was that humans strive for stability. 
Thus, Bellah adds that “identity does not change except under very severe pressure.”3 Orrin Klapp, 
Bellah’s contemporary, addresses this same drive for consistency in Collective Search for Identity: 
[Identity is] a functioning system of three variables: 1) what a person thinks about himself 
introspectively, 2) what he projects or sees imaged or accepted in the eyes of others (his social 
identity); and 3) his feelings validated when “real to me” and when shared with others.4 
Here, identity is conceived as the overlap of  these three components. Continuity is assumed, this time 
imagined as the nucleus of  a Venn diagram where the three constituent circles are labeled: self-definition, 
social identity, and emotional concord between self  and others.  
 It is significant to note that definitions of  identity similar to Klapp’s persist in religious studies. 
Social anthropologist and theologian Douglas Davies only recently defined identity as “the intersection 
point of  self-understanding, of  the views others have of  us, and of  a society’s preferred values and 
associated emotions.”5 In this sense, identity is the product of  personal negotiations with society, but the 
                                                 
2 Robert Bellah, ed. Religion and Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 173. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Orrin E. Klapp, Collective Search for Identity (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 39. 
5 Douglas J. Davies, Emotion, Identity, and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2. 
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emphasis remains on the success of  such negotiations rather than the interminable discord caused by 
changing circumstances. 
The Situational 
 Social psychologist Steven Hitlin poignantly summarizes the situationalist position: “Decades of  
social psychological research can be boiled down to one insight: if  we want to predict someone’s behavior, 
we are better off  knowing where they are rather than who they are.”6 Likewise, sociologist Sheldon 
Stryker incorporates similar conclusions into his concept of  identity salience: “Identity salience is 
defined as the probability that identity will be invoked across a variety of  situations, or alternatively 
across persons in a given situation.”7 The resounding consensus is that “persons have as many identities 
as distinct networks of  relationships in which they occupy positions and play roles” (Stryker et al. 2000: 
286).8 For sociologist Mark Chaves, this directly affects the scientific study of  religion. His recent 
comments on the religious congruence fallacy explain why. Chaves defines religious congruence as 
“consistency among an individual’s religious beliefs and attitudes, consistency between religious ideas 
and behavior, and religious ideas, identities, or schemas that are chronically salient and accessible to 
individuals across contexts and situations.”9 Scholars commit a fallacy, then, when they ignore the 
ubiquity of  incongruence and mistakenly “connect religiosity to what look like logically related 
outcomes.”10 After all, “striving for congruence is not an essential feature of  religion—unless we declare 
it such by definition.”11  
                                                 
6 Steven Hitlin, Moral Selves, Evil Selves: The Social Psychology of Conscience (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 93. 
7 Sheldon Stryker and Peter Burke, “The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 63:4 
(2000): 286. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Mark Chaves, “Rain Dances in the Dry Season: Overcoming the Religious Congruence Fallacy,” Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 49:1 (2010): 6. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, 9. 
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 Religious identity, then, is not a cohesive expression or definition of  one’s social and sacred 
values, roles, and actions. Instead, religious identity may transform over time, receive fresh articulation 
given new situations, or may struggle with or against alternative identities throughout the daily life of  
the actor. The various understandings of  identity offered by those in the situationalist camp necessarily 
focus on this competition and the presence, or not, of  corresponding behaviors. The continuity and 
stability noted by Bellah and others is empirically invalidated by the myriad of  supporting studies offered 
by these contemporary social scientists.  
The Ideal as Potential Solution 
 Sociological theories, however, frequently employ the term ideal in order to underscore the social 
foundations of  religious beliefs as well as the function of  religion in society. In his ideal-society theory, 
Harold Fallding maintains the veracity of  an objective ideal outside of  human experience, an “ideal 
possibility, a potential, within every encounter, relationship and society which constitutes it from the 
beginning, and which can guide its unfolding and judge it at the end as having realized or forfeited its 
opportunity.”12 In response to this objective potentiality, humans establish their own life-possibility, or 
ideal form of  existence. Writing in the late 19th century, Georg Simmel concurs by describing the social 
origins of  religion in terms of  a community’s claims and benefits on the one hand and the individual’s 
ethical-social duties on the other; these interact in such a way that a concept of  the Absolute is 
necessarily and naturally posited in order to provide objectivity to both. Thus, “The relations between 
people…find their substantial and ideal expression in the idea of  the divine.”13  
 In The Elementary Forms of  Religious Life, Émile Durkheim similarly asserts that religion 
expresses a “collective ideal” which is the result of  “the school of  collective life that the individual has 
                                                 
12 Harold Fallding, “Made in the Likeness of God; or, the Religious Realization of Human Identity; or, Religion without 
Illusion,” Sociological Analysis 40:2 (1979): 147. 
13 Georg Simmel, Essays on Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 118. Emphasis added. 
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learned to idealize.”14 It should also be noted that Durkheim carefully states, “…it is an arbitrary 
simplification to see only the idealistic side of  religion—in its way, it is realistic.15 Religion reflects 
society, both through abstract idealizations and integrations of  reality. This resembles Hans Mol’s 
observation of  a tension between the ultimate meaning offered by religions and the moral codes therein. 
Succinctly expressed, “The relevance of  a moral system lies in its capacity to be concrete rather than 
eternal. The relevance of  a meaning system lies in its capacity to be eternal rather than concrete.”16 For 
Mol, this is evidence of  the dialectical nature of  society and its institutions; there is incessant oscillation 
between adaptability and stability.17  
 For us, Mol’s statement serves as a window into one possibility for retaining identity as a salient 
analytical tool. Moral codes and meaning systems are the two sides of  the religious coin. The former 
illuminates the observed incongruence of  religious patterns (the failure to achieve the ideal morality) 
while the latter sheds light on the presence of  primordial notions (as myths and rituals reinforce an ideal 
history and self-definition). If, sociologically speaking, religions are idealizations of  social living, then 
perhaps it is appropriate to view religious identities as idealizations as well. In other words, the 
relationship between belief  and behavior is not one of  cause and effect, but they both have the potential 
to evoke identity because they are both a form of  the ideal. The meaning system posits historical 
continuity; the moral system delineates the congruent from the incongruent as community members 
enjoy varying degrees of  success in abiding by the rules and espoused values of  the collective. 
 
                                                 
14 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 318. 
15 Ibid, 315. 
16 Hans Mol, Identity and the Sacred (New York: Free Press, 1976), 82. 
17 See, Identity and the Sacred (New York: Free Press, 1976) for Mol’s book-length explication of a general theory of religion 
and identity based on a dialectic model. 
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 Identity is not only a nebulous term in everyday parlance; it is an almost insurmountable obstacle 
in academic study. Though there may be legitimate cause for concern, the notion of  identity generally, 
and religious identity in particular, should not be abandoned. In a sense, we are striving to end the game 
of  tug-of-war between those in the vein of  Rudolph Otto or Mircea Eliade and those who eschew 
interpretation in favor of  dry data collection. In striking fashion, the same tension permeates the 
dichotomous categorizations of  identity theories adumbrated by Coleman and Collins. Primordial 
definitions stem from efforts to capture emic conceptions of  identity while situational approaches derive 
from empirical, etic studies.  
 These two categories may be integrated in our view. It is possible to approach religious identity 
as an ideal put forward by religion. In this sense, it purports to infiltrate the group’s values, attitudes, 
memories, and ethics. It extends historical continuity, stability, and order but leaves room for religious 
incongruence by persisting as a sacred cloak covering all experiences: moral successes and failure, 
congruence and inconsistency. Perhaps the question, then, is not whether and to what extent self-
identified Muslims (or Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, etc.) act in ways consonant with their religion’s 
beliefs but how they use their religion to interpret both the moments when they do and do not exhibit 
such congruence. As investigators of  religious phenomena, we should remember that identities are 
invoked separately from any actions performed. With this is mind, it may be easier to see both the import 
of  identity for the believers themselves as well as some of  the minutiae of  their religious systems. 
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